The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition. A Note. by Buehler, Stefan et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Stefan Buehler and Anton Burger and Robert Ferstl
The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition. A Note.
Working Paper
Original Citation:
Buehler, Stefan and Burger, Anton and Ferstl, Robert (2008) The Investment Effects of Price
Caps under Imperfect Competition. A Note. Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory
Economics, 2008,3. Forschungsinstitut für Regulierungsökonomie, WU Vienna University of
Economics and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/1766/
Available in ePubWU: March 2010
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
The Investment Effects of Price Caps under
Imperfect Competition: A Note∗
Stefan Buehler† Anton Burger‡ Robert Ferstl§
September 4, 2008
Abstract
This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs
and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find
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1 Introduction
We employ a simple Cournot model to analyze the investments effects of price
caps under imperfect competition. In this model, each firm solves a peak-
load pricing problem1 facing imperfect competition and price-cap regulation.
Our analysis thus combines capacity choice under imperfect competition2 with
price-cap regulation.3 This note is perhaps most closely related to Hobbs and
Pang (2007), who observe that imposing price caps can destroy uniqueness
properties in oligopoly models. However, these authors adopt an operations-
research approach incorporating uncertainty and do not study the investment
effects of imposing price caps. In a related paper, Grobman and Carey (2001)
focus on the investment effects of price caps but abstract from imperfect com-
petition.
In our model, firms choose their capacity so as to match their largest equi-
librium output. Consequently, a firm’s capacity is typically binding in periods
with peak demand and slack in periods with lower demand. The effects of
price caps on capacity investments crucially depend on the level at which they
are set: Clearly, a (non-binding) price cap set above the equilibrium peak price
does not affect investment. A price cap set below the long-run marginal cost
of the most efficient firm, in turn, makes investment unprofitable and leads
to excess demand and market break-down in peak periods in the absence of
(non-price) rationing. More interestingly, a binding price cap set above the
long-run marginal cost of the most efficient firm does increase (rather than
decrease) aggregate investment, even though it limits the scarcity rents that
firms can generate in peak periods. The result follows from the fact that the
price cap forces firms to produce a higher aggregate output than in the un-
restricted equilibrium. Firms are willing to produce this output—and make
the necessary capacity investments—provided that the price cap exceeds their
long-run marginal cost.
2 The Model
We study a simple Cournot model where firms choose capacities and outputs
endogenously. Suppose n firms indexed by i = 1, ..., n compete in a market
1See Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 21) for a concise description of the peak-load pricing
problem. Crew et al. (1995) provide a comprehensive survey.
2Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) is the classic reference. See, e.g., Gabszewicz and Poddar
(1997), Genc et al. (2007), and Zhuang and Gabriel (2008) for more recent contributions.
3See Armstrong and Sappington (2008) for a survey of recent developments in the theory
of regulation.
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with inverse demand P t(Qt), where Qt ≡
∑
i q
t
i denotes aggregate output and
the superscript indicates period t = 1, ..., T . Assume that demand is concave,
such that P t ′(Qt) < 0 and P t ′′(Qt) ≤ 0 for all t. Each firm i chooses a fixed
capacity Ki ≥ 0 to be used during the T periods. The investment cost is
c0iKi. The short-run marginal cost is ci for q
t
i ≤ Ki and +∞ for q
t
i > Ki.
The long-run marginal cost is (ci + c
0
i ). That is, each firm i faces a peak-load
pricing problem with elastic and deterministic market demand under imperfect
competition.
Apart from the non-negativity constraints on capacity Ki and outputs
qti , t = 1, ..., T , each firm i faces two restrictions: First, its output can never
exceed the capacity level Ki. Second, the market price P
t(Qt) is subject to a
price cap p¯ that may or may not be binding. The profit-maximization problem
of firm i is thus given by
max
qi,Ki
pii(qi, Ki) =
∑
t
(
P t(Qt)− ci
)
qti − c
0
iKi (1)
s.t.
Ki ≥ q
t
i for all t
p¯ ≥ P t(Qt) for all t
qti ≥ 0 for all t
Ki ≥ 0,
where qi = [q
1
i , q
2
i , ..., q
T
i ] is the vector of firm i’s outputs. The associated
Lagrangian is given by
Li(qi, Ki,λi,µ,ψi, γi) =
∑
t
(P t(Qt)− ci)q
t
i − c
0
iKi (2)
+
∑
t
λti(Ki − q
t
i) +
∑
t
µt(p¯− P t(Qt))
+
∑
t
ψtiq
t
i + γiKi,
where λi = [λ
1
i , λ
2
i , ..., λ
T
i ], µ = [µ
1, µ2, ..., µT ], ψi = [ψ
1
i , ψ
2
i , ..., ψ
T
i ], and γi
denote Lagrange multipliers. We characterize the properties of the Cournot-
Nash equilibria using the necessary first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions for local
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optima for all t:
∂Li(·)
∂qti
= P t(Qt)− ci + (q
t
i − µ
t)P t ′(Qt)− λti + ψ
t
i = 0 (3)
∂Li(·)
∂Ki
= −c0i +
∑
t
λti + γi = 0 (4)
∂Li(·)
∂λti
= Ki − q
t
i ≥ 0
∂Li(·)
∂µt
= p¯− P t(Qt) ≥ 0
∂Li(·)
∂ψti
= qti ≥ 0
∂Li(·)
∂γi
= Ki ≥ 0
λti(Ki − q
t
i) = 0
µt(p¯− P t(Qt)) = 0
ψtiq
t
i = 0
γiKi = 0
We first note the existence of a pure-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium, fol-
lowing Tirole (1988, p. 225). Condition (3) implicitly defines the function
qti(Q
t), which is continuous and non-increasing.4 The same holds for
∑
i q
t
i(Q
t).
Assuming compactness,5 Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem asserts that there is
at least one fixed point such that Qt =
∑
i q
t
i(Q
t). Second, we emphasize that
uniqueness is not guaranteed. In particular, if the price cap is binding and
set sufficiently high for firms to break even, there are typically many pure-
strategy Cournot-Nash equilibria. To see this, consider a period t where the
price cap is binding such that p¯ = P t(Qt). The corresponding Lagrange mul-
tiplier is given by µt = qti > 0, and aggregate output is fixed at Q¯
t ≡ Qt(p¯).
Given any quantity Qt
−i ≤ Q¯
t, firm i’s best response is qti(Q
t
−i) = Q¯
t − Qt
−i
by construction. That is, if the price cap is binding, all output combinations∑
i q
t
i = Q¯
t are pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Clearly, these equilibria are
not payoff-equivalent from a firm’s point of view: Given a fixed price level
p¯ > ci + c
0
i , firm i’s profit is increasing in its output. The price cap thus in-
troduces a coordination problem among firms. Aggregate output, however, is
the same across the different pure-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibria for a given
binding price cap.
4Observe that qt
i
(Qt) is non-increasing because either µt = 0 or, if µt > 0, P t(Qt) = p¯.
5That is,
∑
i
qt
i
(0) ≥ 0 and
∑
i
qt
i
(Qt) < Qt for any Qt such that P t(Qt) = 0.
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To see how firm i’s output decision interacts with its capacity decision,
consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions again. Condition (3) specifies that firm
i acquires a scarcity rent λti > 0 if its capacity Ki is binding in equilibrium
in period t. Assuming that it is profitable for firm i to produce a strictly
positive output in at least one period (such that γi = 0), firm i thus invests
in capacity until the marginal cost c0i equals the sum of scarcity rents
∑
t λ
t
i
acquired in all periods t (see condition (4)). Note that firm i’s capacity Ki
is binding in periods with peak demand and typically slack in periods with
lower demand. More importantly, firms always choose their individual capac-
ities such that they match their highest equilibrium output exactly to avoid
foregoing profitable sales in high-demand periods.6
Let us now consider how a binding price cap affects aggregate capacity
investments. For a price cap to be binding, it must increase aggregate output
relative to the unrestricted Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since firms choose their
capacities so as to match their highest equilibrium outputs, aggregate invest-
ment must also be higher under the price cap. However, this result does not
hold without qualification: If the price cap is set such that the most efficient
firm cannot cover its long-run marginal cost, demand in peak periods cannot
be profitably satisfied, and the market breaks down in the absence of effective
(non-price) rationing.
3 Linear Example
We illustrate our above analysis assuming that inverse demand is linear and
given by P t(Qt) = at −Qt. To simplify the graphical representation, suppose
that there are only two firms i = 1, 2 and two periods t = 1, 2. Further assume
that a1 = 6 and a2 = 13 (i.e., demand is low in period 1 and high in peak
period 2), and ci = 0 and c
0
i = 1 for i = 1, 2. Finally, suppose that the price
cap is set at p¯ = 4.
Figure 1 illustrates the best-response functions of firms 1 and 2. In period
1, the price cap requires Q¯1 ≥ 2 and is not binding (equilibrium outputs are
given by q1
1
= q1
2
= 2) such that best-response functions are standard. In
period 2, the price cap requires Q¯2 ≥ 9 and is binding (unrestricted equilib-
rium outputs are given by q1
1
= q1
2
= 4), the best-response functions q2
1
(q2
2
)
and q2
2
(q2
1
) are kinked at (3, 6) and (6, 3), respectively, and all output combina-
tions on the straight line from (3, 6) to (6, 3) form pure-strategy Cournot-Nash
6In this simple setting, there are no costs (e.g. depreciation) for having slack capacity
in low-demand periods. With such costs, firms might not be willing to install sufficient
capacity to produce the equilibrium output in peak periods.
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equilibria. Since prices are high enough to cover long-run marginal cost, firms
build sufficient capacities to produce equilibrium outputs. Note that the bind-
ing price cap forces firms to produce more than the unrestricted aggregate
equilibrium output in the peak period, which induces them to make higher ca-
pacity investments to satisfy equilibrium demand (even though scarcity rents
in the peak period are limited). More specifically, setting the price cap at
p¯ = 4 increases aggregate output and thus aggregate capacity from 8 to 9.
In equilibrium, firms have slack capacities in period 1, whereas capacities are
binding in period 2, and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are given by
λ2
1
= λ2
2
= 1.
<Figure 1 around here>
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed what is arguably the simplest conceivable peak-load pric-
ing model combining endogenous capacity choice under imperfect competition
with price-cap regulation. Our analysis suggests that binding price caps set
above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capac-
ity investment since they induce firms to increase aggregate output.
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Figure 1: Best-response functions
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